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Abstract. This paper studies leakage of user passwords and PINs based
on observations of typing feedback on screens or from projectors in the
form of masked characters (∗ or •) that indicate keystrokes. To this end,
we developed an attack called Password and Pin Information Leakage from
Obfuscated Typing Videos (PILOT). Our attack extracts inter-keystroke
timing information from videos of password masking characters displayed
when users type their password on a computer, or their PIN at an ATM.
We conducted several experiments in various attack scenarios. Results in-
dicate that, while in some cases leakage is minor, it is quite substantial in
others. By leveraging inter-keystroke timings, PILOT recovers 8-character
alphanumeric passwords in as little as 19 attempts. When guessing PINs,
PILOT significantly improved on both random guessing and the attack
strategy adopted in our prior work [4]. In particular, we were able to guess
about 3% of the PINs within 10 attempts. This corresponds to a 26-fold
improvement compared to random guessing. Our results strongly indicate
that secure password masking GUIs must consider the information leakage
identified in this paper.
1 Introduction
Passwords and PINs are susceptible to shoulder surfing attacks [25] of which there
are two main types: (1) input-based and (2) output-based. The former is more
common; in it, the adversary observes an input device (keyboard or keypad) as
the user enters a secret (password or PIN) and learns the key-presses. The latter
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involves the adversary observing an output device (screen or projector) while
the user enters a secret which is displayed in cleartext. The principal distinction
between the two types is adversary’s proximity: observing input devices requires
the adversary to be closer to the victim than observing output devices, which
tend to have larger form factors, i.e., physical dimensions.
Completely disabling on-screen feedback during password/PIN entry (as in,
e.g., Unix sudo command) mitigates output-based shoulder-surfing attacks. Un-
fortunately, it also impacts usability: when deprived of visual feedback, users
cannot determine whether a given key-press was registered and are thus more
apt to make mistakes. In order to balance security and usability, user interfaces
typically implement password masking by displaying a generic symbol (e.g., “•”
or “∗”) after each keystroke. This technique is commonly used on desktops,
laptops and smartphones as well as on public devices, such as Automated Teller
Machines (ATMs) or Point-of-Sale (PoS) terminals at shops or gas stations.
Despite the popularity of password masking, little has been done to quantify
how visual keystroke feedback impacts security. In particular, masking assumes
that showing generic symbols does not reveal any information about the corre-
sponding secret. This assumption seems reasonable, since visual representation
of a generic symbol is independent of the key-press. However, in this paper we
show that this assumption is incorrect. By leveraging precise inter-keystroke
timing information leaked by the appearance of each masking symbol, we show
that the adversary can significantly narrow down the password/PIN’s search
space. Put another way, the number of attempts required to brute-force decreases
appreciably when the adversary has access to inter-keystroke timing information.
There are many realistic settings where visual inter-keystroke timing infor-
mation (leaked via appearance of masking symbols) is readily available while
the input information is not, i.e., the input device is not easily observable. For
example, in a typical lecture or classroom scenario, the presenter’s keyboard
is usually out of sight, while the external projector display is wide-open for
recording. Similarly, in a multi-person office scenario, an adversarial co-worker
can surreptitiously record the victim’s screen. The same holds in public scenarios,
such as PoS terminals and ATMs, where displays (though smaller) tend to be
easier to observe and record than entry keypads.
In this paper we consider two representative scenarios: (1) a presenter enters a
password into a computer connected to an external projector; (2) a user enters a
PIN at an ATM in a public location. The adversary is assumed to record keystroke
feedback from the projector display or an ATM screen using a dedicated video
camera or a smartphone. We note that a human adversary does not need to be
present during the attack: recording might be done via an existing camera either
pre-installed or pre-compromised by the adversary, possibly remotely, e.g., as in
the infamous Mirai botnet [16].
Contributions. The main goal of this paper is to quantify the amount of in-
formation leaked through video recordings of on-screen keystroke feedback. To
this end, we conducted extensive data collection experiments that involved 84
subjects.5 Each subject was asked to type passwords or PINs while the screen
or projector was video-recorded using either a commodity video camera and a
smartphone camera. Based on this, we determined the key statistical properties of
resulting data, and set up an attack, called PILOT: Password and Pin Information
Leakage from Obfuscated Typing Videos. It allows us to quantify reduction in
brute-force search space due to timing information. PILOT leverages multiple
publicly available typing datasets to extract population timings, and applies this
information to inter-keystroke timings extracted from videos.
Our results show that video recordings can be effective in extracting precise
inter-keystroke timing information. Experiments show that PILOT substantially
reduces the search space for each password, even when the adversary has no access
to user-specific keystroke templates. When run on passwords, PILOT performed
better than random guessing between 87% and 100% of the time, depending on
the password and the machine learning technique used to instantiate the attack.
The resulting average speedup is between 25% and 385% (depending on the
password), compared to random dictionary-based guessing; some passwords were
correctly guessed in as few as 68 attempts. A single password timing disclosure
is enough for PILOT to successfully achieve these results. However, when the
adversary observes the user entering the password three times, PILOT can crack
the password in as few as 19 attempts. Clearly, PILOT ’s benefits depend in part
on the strength of a specific password. With very common passwords, benefits
of PILOT are limited. Meanwhile, we show that PILOT substantially outperforms
random guessing with less common passwords. With PINs, disclosure of timing
poses an effective risk. The PIN guessing algorithm can reduce the number of
attempts up to 26 times compared to random guessing.
Paper Organization. Section 2 overviews state-of-the-art in password guessing
based on timing attacks. Section 3 presents PILOT and the adversary model. Sec-
tion 4 discusses our data collection and experiments. We then present the results
on password guessing using PILOT in Section 5, and on PIN guessing in Section 6.
The paper concludes with the summary and future work directions in Section 7.
2 Related Work
There is a large body of prior work on timing attacks in the context of keyboard-
based password entry. Song et al. [23] demonstrated a weakness that allows the
adversary to extract information about passwords typed during SSH sessions. The
attack relies on the fact that, to minimize latency, SSH transmits each keystroke
immediately after entry, in a separate IP packet. By eavesdropping on such
packets, the adversary can collect accurate inter-keystroke timing information.
Authors in [23] showed that this information can be used to restrict the search
space of passwords. The impact of this work is significant, because it shows the
power of timing attacks on cracking passwords.
There are several studies of keystroke inference from analysis of video record-
ings. Balzarotti et al. [5] addressed the typical shoulder-surfing scenario, where a
5 Where required, IRB approvals were duly obtained prior to the experiments.
camera tracks hand and finger movements on the keyboard. Text was automati-
cally reconstructed from resulting videos. Similarly, Xu et al. [32] recorded user’s
finger movements on mobile devices to infer keystroke information. Unfortunately,
neither attack applies to our sample scenarios, where the keyboard is invisible
to the adversary.
Shukla et al. [22] showed that text can be inferred even from videos where the
keyboard/keypad is not visible. This attack involved analyzing video recordings
of the back of the user’s hand holding a smartphone in order to infer which
location on the screen is tapped. By observing the motion of the user’s hand,
the path of the finger across the screen can be reconstructed, which yields the
typed text. In a similar attack, Sun et al. [24] successfully reconstructed text
typed on tablets by recording and analyzing the tablet’s movements, rather than
movements of the user’s hands.
The closest work to the paper is our prior work [4], in which we show that
passwords can be inferred at a higher probability than random guesses using
the timing information from onscreen keystroke feedback. However, in [4] we
concluded that the timing information is not helpful in inferring PINs. In this
paper, we revisit our earlier conclusion on inferring PINs and show that it is
incorrect. In fact, the attack strategy employed in this paper yielded a 26-fold
improvement in inferring PINs over random guesses and significantly outperform
[4] in terms of number of PINs recovered within a small number of attempts.
Another line of work aimed to quantify keystroke information inadvertently
leaked by motion sensors. Owusu et al. [18] studied this in the context of a
smartphone’s inertial sensors while the user types using the on-screen keyboard.
The application used to implement this attack does not require special privileges,
since modern smartphone operating systems do not require explicit authorization
to access inertial sensors data. Similarly, Wang et al. [29] explored keystroke infor-
mation leakage from inertial sensors on wearable devices, e.g., smartwatches and
fitness trackers. By estimating the motion of a wearable device placed on the wrist
of the user, movements of the user’s hand over a keyboard can be inferred. This
allows learning which keys were pressed during the hand’s path. Compared to our
work, both [18] and [29] require a substantially higher level of access to the user’s
device. To collect data from inertial sensors the adversary must have previously
succeeded in deceiving the user into installing a malicious application, or otherwise
compromised the user’s device. In contrast, PILOT is a fully passive attack.
Acoustic emanations represent another effective side-channel for keystroke
inference. This class of attacks is based on the observation that different keyboard
keys emit subtly different sounds when pressed. This information can be captured
(1) locally, using microphones placed near the keyboard [3,34], or (2) remotely, via
Voice-over-IP [10]. Also, acoustic emanations captured using multiple microphones
can be used to extract locations of keys on a keyboard. As shown by Zhou et
al. [33], recordings from multiple microphones can be used to accurately quantify
time difference of arrival (TDoA), and thus triangulate positions of pressed keys.
3 System and Adversary Model
We now present the system and adversary model used in the rest of the paper.
We model a user logging in (authenticating) to a computer system or an
ATM using a PIN or a password (secret) entered via keyboard or keypad (input
device). The user receives immediate feedback about each key-press from a screen,
a projector, or both (output device) in the form of dots or asterisks (masking
symbols). Shape and/or location of each masking symbol does not depend on
which key is pressed. The adversary can observe and record the output device(s),
though not the input device or the user’s hands. An example of this scenario is
shown in Figure 1. The adversary’s goal is to learn the user’s secret.
The envisaged attack setting is representative of many real-world scenarios
that involve low-privilege adversaries, including: (1) a presenter in a lecture or
conference who types a password while the screen is displayed on a projector. The
entire audience can see the timing of appearance of masking symbols, and the
adversary can be anyone in the audience; (2) an ATM customer typing a PIN. The
adversary who stands in line behind the user might have an unobstructed view
of the screen, and the timing of appearance of masking symbols (see Figure 2);
and (3) a customer enters her debit card PIN at a self-service gas-station pump.
In this case, the adversary can be anyone in the surroundings with a clear view
of the pump’s screen.
Although these scenarios seem to imply that adversary is located near the user,
proximity is not a requirement for our attack. For instance, the adversary could
watch a prior recording of the lecture in scenario (1); or, could be monitoring
the ATM machine using a CCTV camera in (2); or, remotely view the screen
in (3) through a compromised IoT camera.
Also, we assume that, in many cases, the attack involves multiple observations.
For example, in scenario (1), the adversary can observe the presenter during
multiple talks, without the presenter changing passwords between talks. Similarly,
in scenario (2), customers often return to the same ATM.
Fig. 1. Example attack scenario.
(a) (b)
Fig. 2. Attack example – ATM setting.
(a) Adversary’s perspective. (b) Out-
sider’s perspective.
4 Overview and Data Collection
We assume that the adversary can capture only inter-keystroke timings leaked
by the output device while the user types a secret. The goal is to analyze differ-
ences between the distribution of inter-keystroke timings and infer corresponding
keypairs. This data is used to identify the passwords that are most likely to be
correct, thus restricting the brute-force search space of the secret. To accurately
extract inter-keystroke timing information, we analyze video feeds of masking
symbols, and identify the frame where each masking symbol first appears. In this
setting, accuracy and resolution of inter-keystroke timings depends on two key
factors: refresh frequency of the output device, and frame rate of the video cam-
era. Inter-keystroke timings are then fed to a classifier, where classes of interest
are keypairs. Since we assume that the adversary has no access to user-specific
keystroke information, the classifier is trained on population data, rather than
on user-specific timings.
In the rest of this section, we detail the data collection process. We collected
password data from two types of output devices: a VGA-based external projector,
and LCD screens of several laptop computers. See Section 4.1 for details of these
devices and corresponding procedures. For PIN data, we video-recorded the
screen of a simulated ATM. Details can be found in Section 4.2.
4.1 Passwords
We collected data using an EPSON EMP-765 projector, and using the LCD
screens of the subjects’ laptops computers. In the projector setting, we asked the
subjects to connect their own laptops so they would be using a familiar keyboard.
The refresh rate of both laptop and projector screens were set to 60 Hz – the
default setting for most systems. This setting introduces quantization errors of up
to about 1/60 s≈ 16.7 ms. Thus, events happening within the same refresh window
of 16.7ms are indistinguishable. We recorded videos of the screen and the projector
using the rear-facing camera of two smartphones: Samsung Galaxy S5 and iPhone
7 Plus. With both phones, we recorded videos at 120 frames per second, i.e., 1
frame every 8.3 ms. To ease data collection, we placed the smartphones on a tripod.
When recording the projector, the tripod was placed on a table, filming from a
height of about 165 cm, to be horizontally aligned with respect to the projected
image. When recording laptop screens, we placed the smartphone above and to
the side of the subject, in order to mimic the adversary sitting behind the subject.
All experiments took place indoors, in labs and lecture halls at the authors’
institutions. We recruited a total of 62 subjects, primarily from the student
population of two large universities. Most participants were males in their 20s,
with a technical background and good typing skills. We briefed each subject
on the nature of the experiment, and asked them to type four alphanumerical
passwords: “jillie02”, “william1”, “123brian”, and “lamondre”.We selected
these passwords uniformly at random from the RockYou dataset [1] in order to
simulate realistic passwords. The subjects typed each password three times, while
our data collection software recorded ground-truth keystroke timings of correctly
typed passwords with millisecond accuracy. Timings from passwords that were
typed incorrectly were discarded, and subjects were prompted to re-type the
password whenever a mistake was made. The typing procedure lasted between 1
and 2 minutes, depending on the subject’s typing skills. All subjects typed with
the “touch typing” technique, i.e., using fingers from both hands.
4.2 PINs
We recorded subjects entering 4-digit PINs on a simulated ATM, shown in Figure 3.
Our dataset was based on experiments with 22 participants; 19 subjects completed
three data collection sessions, while 4 subjects completed only one session,
resulting in a total of 61 sessions. At the beginning of each session, the subject
was given 45 seconds to get accustomed with the keypad of the ATM simulator.
During this time, they were free to type as they pleased. Next, a subject was
shown a PIN on the screen for ten seconds (Figure 4a), and, once it disappeared
from the screen, asked to enter it four times (Figure 4b). Subjects were advised
not to read the PINs out loud. This process was repeated for 15 consecutive PINs.
During each session, subjects were presented with the same 15-PIN sequence 3
times. Subjects were given a 30-second break at the end of each sequence.
Fig. 3. Setup used in PIN inference ex-
periments.
(a) (b)
Fig. 4. ATM Simulator during a data
collection session. (a) The simulator dis-
plays the next PIN. (b) A subject types
the PIN from memory.
Specific 4-digit PINs were selected to test whether: (1) inter-keypress time
is proportional to Euclidean Distance between keys on the keypad; and (2) the
direction of movement (up, down, left, or right) between consecutive keys in a
keypair impacts the corresponding inter-key time. We show an example of these
two situations on the ATM keypad in Figure 5. We chose a set of PINs that
allowed collection of a significant number of key combinations appropriate for
testing both hypotheses. For instance, PIN 3179 tested horizontal and vertical
distance two, while 1112 tested distance 0 and horizontal distance 1.
Sessions were recorded using a Sony FDR-AX53 camera, with the pixel reso-
lution of 1,920×1,080 pixels, and 120 frames per second. At the same time, ATM
simulation software collected millisecond-accurate inter-key distance ground truth
by logging each keypress. PIN feedback was shown on a DELL 17” LCD screen
with a refresh rate of 60 Hz, which resulted to each frame being shown for 16.7 ms.
4.3 Timing Extraction from Video
We developed software that analyzes video recordings to automatically detect
appearance of masking symbols and log corresponding timestamps. This software
uses OpenCV [19] to infer the number of symbols present in each image. All frames
are first converted to grayscale, and then processed through a bilateral filter [27]
to reduce noise due to the camera’s sensor. Resulting images are analyzed using
Canny Edge detection [11] to capture the edges of the masking symbol. External
contours are compared with the expected shape of the masking symbol. When
a masking symbol is detected, software logs the corresponding frame number.
Our experiments show that this technique leads to fairly accurate inter-
keystroke timing information. We observed average discrepancy of 8.7 ms (stdev
of 26.6 ms) between the inter-keystroke timings extracted from the video and
ground truth recorded by the ATM simulator. Furthermore, 75% of inter-keystroke
timings extracted by the software had errors under 10 ms, and 97% had errors
under 20 ms. Similar statistics hold for data recorded on keyboards for the
passwords setting. Figure 6 shows the distribution of error discrepancies.
5 Password Guessing
PILOT treats identifying digraphs from keystroke timings as a multi-class clas-
sification problem, where each class represents one digraph, and input to the
classifier is a set of inter-keystroke times. Without loss of generality, in this sec-
tion, we assume that the user’s password is a sequence of lowercase alphanumeric
characters typed on a keyboard with a standard layout.
(a) (b)
Fig. 5. ATM keypad in our experiments.
(a) To type keypairs 1-2 and 1-4, the typing
finger travels the same distance in differ-
ent directions. (b) Keypairs 1-2 and 1-3
require the typing finger to travel different
distances in the same direction.
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To reconstruct passwords, we compared two classifiers: Random Forest
(RF) [15] and Neural Networks (NN) [21]. RF is a well-known classification
technique that performs well for authentication based on keystroke timings [7].
Input to RF is one inter-keystroke timing, and its output is a list of N digraphs
ranked based on the probability of corresponding to input timing. NN is a
more complex architecture designed to automatically determine and extract
complex features from the input distribution. In our experiments, the input to
NN is a list of inter-keystroke timings corresponding to a password. This enables
NN to extract features, such as arbitrary n-grams, or timings corresponding to
non-consecutive characters. NN’s output is a guess for the entire password.
We instantiated NN using the following parameters:
– number of units in the hidden layer – 128 (with ReLU activation functions);
– inclusion probability of the dropout layer – 0.2;
– number of input neurons – 25;
– number of output layers – 25 which represents one character in one-hot
encoding. Output layers use softmax activation function;
– training was performed using batch sizes of 40 and 100 epochs. We used the
Adam optimizer with a learning rate of 0.001.
Classifier Training. We trained PILOT on three public datasets [28,20,6] that
contain keystroke timing information collected from English free-text. Using these
datasets for training, we modeled an attack that relies exclusively on population
data. Without loss of generality, we filtered the datasets to remove all timings that
do not correspond to digraphs composed of alphanumeric lowercase characters.
This is motivated by the datasets’ limited availability of digraph samples that
contain special characters. In practice, the adversary could collect these timings
using, for instance, crowdsourcing tools such as Amazon Mechanical Turk. To take
care of uneven frequencies of different digraphs, we under-represented the most
frequent digraphs in the dataset. Data in public datasets was often gathered from
free-text typing of volunteers. Therefore, more frequent digraphs in English were
represented more than rarer ones. For example, considering lamondre, digraph re
appears 43,606 times in the population dataset, while am – only 6,481. Similarly,
in 123brian, digraph ri occurs 19,782 times, while 3b – only 138. We therefore
under-sampled each digraph appearing more than 1,000 times to 1,000 randomly
selected occurrences. Similarly, we excluded infrequent digraphs that appeared
under 100 times in the whole dataset.
Attack Process. To infer the user’s secret from inter-keystroke timings, PILOT
leverages a dictionary of passwords (e.g., a list of passwords leaked by online
services [1,12,26,2]), possibly expanded using techniques such as probabilistic
context-free grammars [31] and generative adversarial networks [14]. When evalu-
ating PILOT, we assume that the user’s secret is in the dictionary. In practice, this
is often the case, as many users use the same weak passwords (e.g., only 36% of
the password of RockYou is unique [17]), and reuse them across many different ser-
vices [30,13]. Given that the size of a reasonable password dictionary is on the order
of billions of entries,6 the goal of PILOT is to narrow down the possible passwords
6 See for example the lists maintained by https://haveibeenpwned.com/.
to a small(er) list, e.g., to perform online attacks. This list is then ranked by the
probability associated with each entry, computed from inter-keystroke timing data.
Specifically:
1. Using RF, for each inter-key time extracted from video (corresponding to a
digraph), PILOT returns a list of N possible guesses, sorted by the classifier’s
confidence. Next, PILOT ranks the passwords in the dictionary by resulting
probabilities as follows: for each password, PILOT identifies the position in the
ranked list of predictions for the first digraph of the password being guessed,
and assigns that position as a “penalty” to the password. By performing
these steps for each digraph, PILOT obtains a total penalty score for each
password, i.e., a score that indicates the probability of the password given
the output of the RF.
For example, to rank the password jillie02, PILOT first considers the
digraph ji, and the list of predictions of RF for the first digraph. It notes
that ji appears in such list as the X-th most probable; therefore, it assigns
X as the penalty for jillie02. Then, it considers il, which appears in
Y -th position in the list of predictions for the second digraph. Penalty for
jillie02 is thus updated to X + Y . This operation is repeated for all the
7 digraphs, thus obtaining the final penalty score.
2. Using NN, PILOT computes a list of N possible guesses, sorted by the
classifier’s confidence of each guess. In this case, the PILOT processes the entire
list of flight times at once, rather than refining its guess with each digraph.
We considered the following attack settings: single-shot, and multiple recordings.
With the former, the adversary trains PILOT with inter-keystroke timings from
population data, i.e., from users other than the target, e.g., from publicly avail-
able datasets, or by recruiting users and asking them to type passwords. In this
scenario, the adversary has access to the video recording of a single password
entry session. With multiple recordings, the adversary trains PILOT as before,
and additionally, has access to videos of multiple login instances by the same user.
Training PILOT exclusively with population data leads to more realistic attack
scenarios than training it with user-specific data, because usually the adversary
has limited access to keystrokes samples from the target user. Further, access
to user-specific data will likely improve the success rate of PILOT.
5.1 Results
In this section, we report on PILOT efficacy in reducing search time on the
RockYou [1] password dataset compared to random choice, weighted by prob-
ability. We restricted experiments to the subset of 8-character passwords from
RockYou, since the adversary can always determine password length by counting
the number of masking symbols shown on the screen. This resulted in 6,514,177
passwords, out of which 2,967,116 were unique.
Attack Baseline. To establish the attack baseline, we consider an adversary that
outputs password guesses from a leaked dataset in descending order of frequency.
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Fig. 7. CDF of the amount of passwords recovered by PILOT—Population Data attack
scenario.
(Ties are broken using random selection from the candidate passwords.) Because
password probabilities are far from uniform (e.g., in RockYou, top 200 8-character
passwords account for over 10% of the entire dataset), this is the best adversarial
strategy given no additional information on the target user.
Passwords selected for our evaluation represent a mix of common and rare
passwords. Thus, they have widely varying frequencies of occurrence in RockYou
and expected number of attempts needed to guess each password using the baseline
attack varies significantly. For example, expected number of attempts for:
– 123brian (appears 6 times) – 93,874;
– jillie02, (appears only once) – 1,753,571;
– lamondre (appears twice) – 397,213;
– william1 (appears 1,164 times) – only 187.
Single-shot. Results in the single-shot setting are summarized in Table 1. Cumu-
lative Distribution Function (CDF) of successfully recovered passwords is reflected
in Figure 7, and breakdown of results (by target password) is shown in Figure 8.
Results show that, for uncommon passwords (jillie02 and lamondre), PI-
LOT consistently outperforms random guessing. In particular, for jillie02 both
RF and NN greatly exceed random guessing, since both their curves in Figure
8 are above random guess baseline. For lamondre, RF shows an advantage over
random guess in 76% of the instances, while NN never beats the baseline.
For common passwords, sorted random guess wins over PILOT. In particular,
123brian is both popular (i.e., 93,874-th most popular password of the set,
corresponding to the top 3% of the RockYou dataset) and very hard to recover
with PILOT. This can be observed from Figure 8, where the curves corresponding
to 123brian are least steep. Finally, william1, being the 187-th most popular
password, is always recovered early in our baseline attack, with the notable
exception of one instance by RF.
Table 1. PILOT—Single-shot setting. Avg : average number of attempts to guess a
password; Stdev : standard deviation; Rnd : number of guesses for the baseline adversary;
<Rnd : how often PILOT outperforms random guessing; Best : number of attempts
of the best guess; < n: how many passwords are successfully guessed within first
n = 20,000/100,000 attempts.
Avg Stdev Med Rnd <Rnd Best <20k <100k
Random Forest
123brian 581,743 414,761 508,332 93,874 8.7% 5,535 1.1% 9.3%
jillie02 749,718 448,319 656,754 1,753,571 97.8% 28,962 0.0% 2.7%
lamondre 301,906 334,681 199,344 397,213 75.0% 145 13.0% 33.7%
william1 246,437 264,090 145,966 187 0.5% 68 10.9% 39.9%
Neural Network
123brian 923,534 165,454 886,802 93,874 0.0% 577,739 0.0% 0.0%
jillie02 456,811 210,512 383,230 1,753,571 100.0% 164,754 0.0% 0.0%
lamondre 517,472 189,355 493,713 397,213 28.8% 148,403 0.0% 0.0%
william1 265,813 140,753 215,840 187 0.0% 45,176 0.0% 3.8%
In general, PILOT wins over the sorted random guess on infrequent passwords,
such as jillie02 and lamondre, that appear only once or twice, respectively.
Such infrequent passwords exhibit the same random guess baseline curve and
average, reported in Table 1 and shown in Figure 8. Given the similar steepness of
CDF curves in Figure 8, which hint that PILOT ’s performance might be similar
for many other passwords, PILOT can probably outperform the baseline for
uncommon passwords. We also note that uncommon passwords represent the vast
majority of user-chosen passwords: 90% of RockYou passwords appear at most
twice, and 80% exactly once. We expect that a realistic adversary would first gen-
erate password guesses based on their frequency alone (as in our baseline attack),
and then switch to PILOT once these frequencies drop below some threshold.
Finally, we highlight that random guess baseline is computed on the distribu-
tion of passwords in RockYou. Other datasets might have different distributions:
for example, in the 10 million password list dataset [9], jillie02, lamondre,
and 123brian appear only once, while william1 appears 176 times.
We believe that the discrepancy between performance of PILOT on various
passwords is due to how frequently the digraphs in each password appear in
training data. Specifically, even with our under-representation, all digraphs in
william1, with the exception of m1, are far more frequent in the training data
than 12, 23, 3b, or 02.
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(a) 123brian (183 auth. attempts).
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(b) jillie02 (186 auth. attempts).
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(c) lamondre (184 auth. attempts).
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(d) william1 (183 auth. attempts).
Fig. 8. CDF for the number of passwords recovered by PILOT, for each target password.
Plots also show the baseline attack for the corresponding password.
Regarding specific classifiers, RF overtakes NN in most instances. For example,
when guessing 123brian (Figure 8a), NN performs worse than random guessing
for first 800,000 attempts. Afterwards, NN outperforms both random guessing
and RF. Furthermore, while RF can guess a substantial percentage of passwords
within 20,000, 50,000 and 100,000 attempts, NN cannot achieve the same result.
In terms of minimum number of guesses per password, RF recovered william1
in 68, lamondre in 145, 123brian in 5,535, and jillie02 in 28,962 attempts. NN
required a consistently higher minimum number of attempts for each password.
Multiple Recordings. Information from three login instances was used as fol-
lows. We averaged classifiers’ predictions over three login instances for a given
user, and ranked passwords accordingly.
Results are summarized in Table 2, and Figure 9. Although PILOT still con-
sistently outperforms random guessing, using data from multiple authentication
recordings leads to mostly identical results overall with both RF and NN. PILOT ’s
guessing success rate for 123brian and jillie02 is slightly improved compared
to the previous setting and minimum number of attempts to recover each password
Table 2. PILOT—Multiple recordings setting. Avg : average number of attempts to
guess a password; Stdev : standard deviation; Rnd : number of guesses for the baseline
adversary; <Rnd : how often PILOT outperforms random guessing; Best : number of
attempts of the best guess; < n: how many passwords are successfully guessed within
first n = 20,000/100,000 attempts.
Avg Stdev Med Rnd <Rnd Best <20k <100k
Random Forest
123brian 552,574 468,539 402,166 93,874 14.1% 13,931 4.7% 14.1%
jillie02 713,895 410,225 606,403 1,753,571 100.0% 67,875 0.0% 1.6%
lamondre 398,186 425,811 236,905 397,213 65.6% 404 6.2% 25.0%
william1 370,933 602,654 148,405 187 1.6% 19 17.2% 42.2%
Neural Network
123brian 922,655 129,927 889,406 93,874 0.0% 676,418 0.0% 0.0%
jillie02 439,414 155,385 402,332 1,753,571 100.0% 205,645 0.0% 0.0%
lamondre 503,248 137,276 504,493 397,213 21.3% 182,123 0.0% 0.0%
william1 248,769 103,240 216,630 187 0.0% 86,213 0.0% 1.6%
diminished slightly. We recovered william1 in 19, lamondre in 404, 123brian in
13,931, and jillie02 in 67,875 attempts. Overall, results show that there are no
substantial benefits in using timing data from three recordings from the same user.
6 PIN Guessing
In this section, we present our results on PIN-guessing. First, we analyze the
relationship between inter-keystroke timings and Euclidean Distance between
consecutive keys, and between inter-keystroke timings and direction of movement
on the keypad. We then show how the adversary can use timing information to
infer key distances, and therefore to predict PINs.
We are not aware of any publicly-available PIN timing datasets that can be
used to train PILOT. To address this issue, we collected data from 22 users. To
compute the attack baseline, we considered all PINs to be equally likely, i.e., we
are modeling PINs as random four-digit strings. This is consistent with how many
European banks assign PINs to bank cards [?], and with the work of Bonneau et
al. [8], which showed that users are reluctant to change the random PIN provided
by their bank.
Distance. Across all subjects, we observed that distributions of inter-keystroke
latencies were distinct in all cases (for p-value < 5 · 10−6), with the following
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Fig. 9. CDF showing number of passwords recovered by PILOT in the Multiple recordings
scenario.
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(b) Modeled as gamma distributions.
Fig. 10. Inter-keystroke timings of all possible distances for ATM keypad typing.
exceptions: (1) latencies for distance 2 (e.g., keypair 1-3) were close to latencies
for distance 3 (keypair 2-0); (2) latencies for distance 2 were close to latencies for
diagonal 1×1 (e.g., keypair 4-8); latencies for distance 3 were close to latencies
for 2×1 diagonal (i.e. “2” to “9”, “1” to “6”, etc.), and diagonal 2×2 (e.g.,
keypair 7-3), and diagonal 3×2 (e.g., keypair 3-0). Figure 10a shows the various
probability distributions, while Figure 10b models these different probability
distribution functions as gamma distributions. In Figure 10a, dist zero indicates
keypairs composed of the same two digits. dist one, dist two, and dist three shows
timings distributions for keypairs with horizontal or vertical distance one (e.g.,
keypair 2-5), two (e.g., 2-8), and three (2-0), respectively. dist diagonal one and
dist diagonal two indicates keypairs with diagonal distance one (e.g., 2-4) and
distance two (e.g., 1-9), respectively. dist dogleg and dist long dogleg show timing
distributions of keypairs such as 1-8 and 0-3. In Figure 10b, dist one horizontal and
dist one vertical indicate Euclidean Distance right in the left/right directions, and
up/down directions, respectively, while dist one up, dist one down, dist one left,
and dist one right indicate distances one in the up, down, left, and right directions.
Direction. The relative orientation of key pairs characterized by the same Eu-
clidean distance (e.g., 2-3 vs. 2-5) has a negligible impact on the corresponding
inter-key latency. We observed that the distributions of keypress latencies ob-
served from each possible direction between keys were not significantly different
(for p-value < 10−4). Figure 11 shows different probability distributions relative
to various directions for Euclidean distance 1.
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6.1 Pin Inference
Using the data we collected, we mapped the distribution of inter-keypress la-
tencies, and used the resulting probabilities to test the effectiveness of PINs
prediction from inter-key latencies. Our PIN guessing algorithm is composed of
two parts: (1) an algorithm that estimates distances from keystroke timings; and
(2) an algorithm that ranks PINs based on the estimated distances. The core idea
is to consider the PIN pad as a weighed multigraph. The graph nodes represent
the keys, and are labeled 0-9. Keys are connected by weighted edges. The weight
of an edge corresponds to the Euclidean distance between the corresponding keys,
using the distance between two adjacent keys (e.g., 1 and 2) as unit. We identified
8 possible distances: zero distance (e.g., key 3 followed by key 3, weight = 0);
horizontal or vertical distance one (e.g. keys 1-2, weight = 1); horizontal or
vertical distance two (e.g., keys 1-3, weight = 2); vertical distance three (e.g.,
keys 2-0, weight = 3); diagonal distance one (e.g., keys 1-5, weight =
√
12 + 12);
diagonal distance two (e.g., keys 1-9, weight =
√
22 + 22); short diagonal distance
(e.g., keys 1-8, weight =
√
12 + 22) and long diagonal distance (e.g. keys 1-0,
weight =
√
12 + 32).
For each PIN, we created three sets a subgraphs, indicated as S1, S2, and
S3, composed only of the nodes connected by edges with the same weight as the
weight = 3 weight = √2 
weight = 0 
S1 S2 S3 
G 
Fig. 12. Full graph, and subgraphs h1 ∈ S1 (weight = 3), h2 ∈ S2 (weight = 0), and
h3 ∈ S3 (weight =
√
2).
estimated distance. Specifically, Si contains all the two-nodes subgraphs such
that their edges have weight equal to the estimated distance between the keys
in the i-th PIN digraph.
We combined the subgraphs in these sets by ensuring that, for i = 1 and i = 2,
the second node of a graph from Si is the same as the first node of a graph from
Si+1. For instance, given estimated distances 3, 0, and
√
2, our algorithm extracts
the subgraphs shown in Figure 12. It then refines these choices by removing all
subgraphs from S2 which do not have nodes 2 and 0 as their first node. The
same rule is applied to S3. The two resulting graphs are shown in Figure 13.
Not all estimated distances correspond to possible PINs. For instance, esti-
mated distances 3, 0, and
√
8 do not match any PIN that can be typed on the
pad used for the experiments: distance 3 indicates that the second PIN digit
must be either 0 or 2; as a consequence, distance 0 associated to the second PIN
digraph restricts the third PIN digit to 0 or 2; however, the set of keypairs with
a relative distance of
√
8 (i.e., {(1, 9), (7, 3), (9, 1), (3, 7)}) does not include keys
0 or 2. Therefore, estimated distances 3, 0, and
√
8 do not lead to any valid PIN.
Figure 14 shows a visual representation of this example.
For each triplet of estimated distances, the number of associated PINs may
differ. For example, 58 triplets have no associated PIN (e.g., distances 3, 0, and√
8). The remaining 454 combinations vary from a minimum of 2 associated PINs
(57 combinations; e.g., distances 3, 3, and 3 correspond only to PINs 2020 and
0202) to a maximum of 216 PINs (distances 1, 1, and 1).
If the adversary is able to reconstruct the distances between digraphs with-
out errors, this process drastically reduces the number of attempts needed to
guess the PIN compared to a random guessing. Figure 15 shows the benefit of
this approach in terms of percentage of PINs guessed within a fixed number of
S1 S2 S3 
2 - 0 1 - 1 1 - 5 
0 - 2 2 - 2 2 - 4 
3 - 3 2 - 6 
4 - 4 3 - 5 
5 - 5 4 - 2 
6 - 6 4 - 8 
7 - 7 … 
8 - 8 7 - 0 
9 - 9 8 - 4 
0 - 0 8 - 6 
9 - 0 
0 - 7 
0 - 9 
Fig. 13. Nodes sequences for input distances 3, 0,
√
2.
attempts. However, due to the overlapping between timing distributions shown
in figures 10 and 11, the adversary cannot always estimate distances correctly.
To evaluate the impact of distance evaluation errors on PIN guessing, we split
our keystroke dataset in two sets. The first (training set) consists of 5195 PIN,
typed by 11 participants. The second (testing set) consists of 5135 PIN, typed
by a distinct set of 11 participants.
For each PIN in the testing set, we associated a list of triplets of distances
sorted by their probability as determined using the gamma distributions. Figure
16 shows the effectiveness of this algorithm compared to random guessing, and
compared to the technique used in [4]. Our results show that our technique signif-
icantly improves on both random guessing and [4] (see Table 3). In particular, we
were able to guess about 3% of the PINs within 10 attempts. This corresponds
to a 26-fold improvement compared to random guessing. Moreover, we were able
to significantly outperform [4] in terms of number of PINs recovered within a
small number of attempts. Specifically, we were able to recover more than 1%
of the PINs within 5 attempts, while [4] could guess only 0.32% of the PINs
within the same number of attempts. In summary, our technique demonstrates
that inter-keystroke timings contain considerable information about the physical
distance between consecutive keys in a PIN, and thus they can substantially
reduce the number of attempts required to guess a PIN.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that inter-key timing information disclosed by
showing password masking symbols can be effectively used to reduce the cost
of password guessing attacks. To determine the impact of this side channel, we
recorded videos from 84 subjects, typing several passwords and PINs under
different conditions: in a lecture hall, while their laptop was collected to a
projector; in a classroom setting; and using a simulated ATM machine. Our results
show that: (1) it is possible to infer very accurate timing information from videos
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Fig. 14. (a) Subgraphs corresponding to distances 3, 0, and
√
22 + 22. (b) Nodes
connected by vertices weights 3, 0, and
√
22 + 22. No common nodes are in S2 and S3,
and therefore this combination of distances does not correspond to any PIN.
of LCD screens and projectors (the average error was 8.7ms, which corresponds
to the duration of a frame when the refresh rate of a display is set to 60 Hz); (2)
inter-keystroke timings reduce the number of attempts to recover a password by
25% and 385%, with some passwords guessed within 19 attempts. We consider
this a substantial reduction in the cost of password guessing attacks, to the point
that we believe that masking symbols should not be publicly displayed when
typing passwords; and (3) disclosing inter-keystroke timings have a significant
impact on PIN guessing attacks. In particular, we were able to predict about 1 in
14 PINs within 40 attempts, compared to one in 250 with no timing information.
While this result is not as dramatic as the one with passwords, it suggests that
keystroke timing information should be carefully concealed by ATMs.
Fig. 15. CDF showing the number of PINs recovered under the assumption that
distances are recovered without error.
Fig. 16. CDF showing the number of PINs recovered on our dataset, compared to the
baseline and the algorithm of [4].
Clearly, the benefits of PILOT compared to our baseline attack vary depending
on how common the user’s password is. For very common (and therefore very
easy to guess) passwords, our results show that PILOT might not be needed. On
the other hand, the speedup offered by PILOT when guessing rare passwords
is substantial. Given the effectiveness of this attack on password guessing, we
think that future work should consider countermeasures that strike the right
balance between usability and security when displaying masking symbols. For
instance, GUIs may not display masking symbols on a secondary screen (e.g.,
projectors), or may display new masking symbols at fixed intervals (say, every
250ms). Clearly, both countermeasures have usability implications, and we leave
the quantification of this impact to future work.
Table 3. Percentage of PIN guessed using our technique, Random Guessing (RG), PIN
guessing with exact distance (Exact), and [4]
Improvement of our
Attempts Our work RG Exact SILK-TV [4] work compared to RG
5 1.09% 0.05% 13.05% 0.32% 21.81×
10 2.65% 0.10% 26.37% 0.47% 26.48×
20 3.93% 0.20% 45.57% 0.79% 19.67×
40 7.05% 0.40% 67.37% 1.31% 17.62×
80 9.41% 0.80% 88.85% 2.28% 11.76×
160 12.89% 1.60% 98.34% 3.82% 8.06×
320 19.69% 3.20% 100.00% 6.34% 6.15×
640 28.33% 6.40% 100.00% 10.05% 4.43×
1280 42.30% 12.80% 100.00% 16.34% 3.30×
2560 59.39% 25.60% 100.00% 27.81% 2.32×
5120 78.53% 52.20% 100.00% 51.84% 1.50×
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